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Private sector pension plans have undergone substantial change in form and structure in the 
United States over the last two decades. This paper explores and evaluates these changes using 
information on pension plan characteristics gathered by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) since 
1980 in their periodic Employee Benefits Survey (EBS) of medium and large establishments. We also 
discuss how future data collection efforts could be improved to better measure key changes in the 
form and design of employer-sponsored pensions. 
Key findings are as follows: Many aspects of defined benefit plans changed over time. For 
example, vesting rules were loosened; plans eased access to normal retirement; and pension benefit 
formulas moved toward final rather than career earnings, with increased weight on straight-time pay.  
In addition, these plans became more integrated with social security; at the same time, the form of 
social security integration changed substantially. The evidence also indicates that defined benefit plan 
replacement rates fell over time and benefit caps limit years of service counted in the retirement 
formula. In addition, disability benefit provisions grew more stringent; and participants were 
increasingly permitted to take a lump sum from their defined benefit plan.  
Defined contribution plans also have evolved over time. Here, plan participants were granted 
greater access to diversified stock and bond funds, and fewer were permitted to invest in own-
employer stock, common stock funds, and guaranteed insurance contracts. Participation and vesting 
rules appear most lenient for workers in 401(k) plans; generally employees must contribute a fraction 
of their pay to their plans rather than relying only on employer contributions; and employee access to 
pension fund assets prior to retirement is growing.   
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The last twenty years brought a substantial transformation in the private pension environment in 
the United States.  Employees grew increasingly interested in pension programs as a consequence of 
baby boomer aging, and workers demanded retirement savings accounts as the robust stock market of 
the 1980s and 1990s made equities an appealing investment.  In addition, rising life expectancies and 
longer worklives enhanced the pension promise among groups that lacked pensions years ago, 
particularly women.
1   Employers, too, were willing and even eager to supply new forms of pensions, 
responding to the need to downsize their workforces, to changes in the industrial and occupational mix of 
employment, and to an interest in using pensions to induce particular worker behaviors.
2  A dynamic 
pension environment was also driven by regulatory developments including tax reform bills changing 
pension funding levels, contribution amounts, and benefit payouts (McGill et al., 1996). In sum, the last 
two decades proved conducive to pension growth and development along some dimensions, but also 
turned out to be a time of substantial challenge to both those wanting and offering pensions in America 
(Sass, 1997). 
This report highlights and evaluates some of the most important changes observed in U.S. private 
sector pension plan retirement formulas and benefit provisions during the 1980s and 1990s. These trends 
in pension provisions and formulas over time are gleaned from a series of reports developed by the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) summarizing information from its periodic Employee Benefits Survey 
(EBS) conducted over the last two decades.  The BLS has only published individual-year summaries but 
not collected the available data into a systematic time series. Therefore we have gathered, organized, 
and interpreted information provided on pension plan characteristics in medium and large establishments 
through 1997, thereby updating our previous study (Mitchell, 1992) that explored changes in pension 
provisions through 1988.  There are no more recent data publicly available for this purpose. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. We begin with a discussion of retirement plan features, 
particularly focusing on benefit formulas.  Next, we analyze trends in retirement provisions and benefit 
formulas found in defined benefit and defined contribution plans over time.  We conclude with a summary 
of findings. 
Overview of Pension Type and Pension Features
3 
In the U.S. corporate or private sector, company pensions were conventionally classified into two 
types: defined contribution (DC) and defined benefit (DB) plans.
4  In a defined contribution pension, the 
covered employee often has a choice as to whether to participate in the plan, and if so, how much to 
contribute to his own retirement saving account.  In addition, the plan sponsor often adds to the 
participating employee’s account, by a match on employee contributions.  Pension contributions funds are 
invested in the capital market, and generally a participant has choice over investment options into which 
his own (and sometimes his employer’s) funds are deposited. Usually, the contributions and earnings on  
 
the investments must be preserved for retirement, but sometimes an active worker may access his funds 
for hardship or some other purpose.  On leaving the firm, the departing worker may receive his accrual in 
the form of a lump sum (thought receipt of the lump sum may trigger a tax penalty unless he is at least 
age 59.5). Alternatively the departing worker may take his pension benefits in the form of a periodic 
amount or buy a life annuity.  The value of the plan accrual at any given date depends on the amounts 
contributed and investment returns over the entire worklife.  
By contrast, a worker with a DB plan receives a promise of an eventual pension benefit that is 
determined by a pre-specified formula. Here the replacement rate (specified as a percent of pre-
retirement pay) is typically a function of the covered worker’s age, pay, and/or service levels. In most 
cases the defined benefit is payable as a life annuity, though as we will show below, the benefit may be 
accessed as a lump sum in some cases. 
Designers of both types of pension plans may select from a range of eligibility, contribution, 
vesting, benefit, withdrawal, and retirement provisions and formulas.  In addition, plans can embody many 
different special provisions regarding post-retirement benefit increases and special payouts (e.g. disability 
or lump sum cashouts), along with other features. It is our goal in this investigation to determine how, if at 
all, pension plans of medium and large establishments in the private sector have changed over the last 
two decades, to determine whether any salient trends deserve attention.  
Understanding how pension provisions and benefit entitlements have changed over the last two 
decades is important for several reasons.  It is well known that many pension provisions powerfully affect 
the nature of the pension promise, and in turn they influence worker and firm behavior (c.f., Gustman and 
Mitchell 1992; Gustman et al., 1994 and 1995). For instance, a pension-covered employee allowed to 
take a loan or a lump-sum cashout from his plan after a short vesting period gains access to his pension 
saving early the worklife, a practice that some worry contributes to inadequate old-age protection. An 
employee prohibited from taking a loan or cashing out his pension when young lacks access to his 
accrued pension, so he may end up with a better-funded retirement period than his counterpart. (On the 
other hand, it is possible that inability to access the funds early in life will discourage participation).  These 
and other structural features of pensions also influence worker turnover patterns. That is, vesting and 
benefit formulas can deter mobility for younger employees, and they can also induce workers to remain 
on the job longer if the plan offers substantial rewards for continued work (c.f., Fields and Mitchell 1984). 
Other times, as in the case of defined contribution pensions, retirement benefits may depend on amounts 
contributed and how the worker chose to invest his pension assets.  It has been shown that investment 
decisions depend to a large degree on how successful employers are in communicating benefit plan 
attributes to employees (Mitchell and Schieber, 1998). 
Before turning to a more detailed discussion of pension trends in the EBS, it is useful to briefly 
review key pension terminology and the importance of specific pension provisions.  
Plan Participation and Vesting.  Workers covered by a private pension are often not permitted to join their 
pension plan immediately; rather many plans limit participation to workers who remain at the firm more  
 
than one year, and sometimes also limit coverage to those over the age of 21.  The Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act [ERISA] of 1974, as amended, mandated that pension plan participation 
requirements could not be more stringent that this (plans may be more generous).   
What is meant by ‘plan participation’ matters, of course, since some pensions begin to count 
years of service for benefit purposes from the date that the worker becomes a plan participant.  ‘Vesting’ 
in a pension plan is important since it refers to the juncture at which the worker gains a legal claim to an 
eventual benefit from a pension plan in which he is a participant.  Many establishments do not offer new 
workers an immediate claim on a retirement benefit; rather, workers will earn claim only when they meet 
employment criteria specified in the plan’s vesting formula.  One criterion often used is a minimum 
number of years of service; in 1974, ERISA spelled out several permitted vesting schedules including the 
most common “10-year cliff vesting rule”, requiring workers to vest at 10 years of service.  Subsequently 
vesting standards were eased under the Tax-Reform Act of 1986, with most plans now using a “5-year 
rule” for cliff vesting.   
Retirement Eligibility Requirements. Most pension plans require that a covered employee must complete 
a requisite number of years of service and/or attain a specified age, in order to receive a pension annuity 
payment.  Thus, for example, a worker may be eligible for early retirement at age 55 with 10 years of 
service, while normal retirement might be defined as leaving at age 65 with at least 10 years of service. 
Such plan-based age and service requirements are common in DB plans and sometimes are 
found in DC pensions.  When they exist, the rules establish conditions under which the worker can claim 
plan benefits.  Eligibility requirements play a particularly crucial role in DB plans, since here age and 
service influence not only access to benefits, but also the level of benefits payable.  For instance, an early 
retiree might receive a lower annual benefit amount than the one payable at the plan’s normal retirement 
age.  A higher benefit at the plan’s normal retirement age recognizes the fact that at a later age, a worker 
has more years of service, possibly a higher pay level, and fewer years of life remaining over which to 
draw a benefit.  In addition, defined benefit plans frequently structure their benefit formulas so as to 
subsidize early retirement (c.f., Fields and Mitchell 1984).  Hence retirement requirements are important 
insofar as they establish when a worker may begin to receive subsidized early payouts.   
For many years, corporate sponsors in the U.S. were permitted to use their pension formulas to 
induce older workers to leave their jobs, mainly by limiting pension accruals after a specific age (Luzadis 
and Mitchell 1998).  But in an effort to reduce the extent of age discrimination, the Omnibus 
Reconciliation Act of 1986 required private-sector pensions to continue benefit accruals after normal 
retirement, a ruling that took effect for most private sector pensions in 1988.  (Collectively bargained 
plans were permitted somewhat longer to come into compliance.)  Hence retirement eligibility rules for 
private sector pension plans have become more liberal over time, somewhat increasing benefit incentives 
to remain employed at older ages.    
 
Retirement Contribution and Benefit Provisions. 
Defined Benefit Plans: Defined benefit plans use many different methods to compute participants’ 
payouts at retirement. Some pension benefit formulas provide for flat monthly dollar benefit entitlements 
per year of service, while others base benefits on employee pay, age, and/or service at retirement. If 
pension benefits depend on earnings, the employer generally specifies what percentage of earnings will 
be paid per year of service.  A related issue is that earnings-based plans differ in terms of which definition 
of earnings they consider relevant. For instance, straight-time pay alone may be considered, or a plan 
may add overtime, shift pay, and/or commissions into the formula. In addition, pay-based plans differ in 
terms of the period of time over which earnings are computed.  In a career earnings plan, pay during the 
entire period of employment is considered; conversely, a terminal earnings plan focuses on compensation 
just prior to retirement. Even terminal earnings benefit formulas generally include more than the final 
year’s pay in the formula; it is not uncommon to use the worker’s highest or last 5 years as the basis for a 
final average pay figure. 
In some cases pension formulas are integrated with social security rules following one of two 
general patterns.
5 “Offset” formulas typically reduce a pension benefit payment by some fraction of the 
worker’s primary social security amount, while an “excess” plan will apply lower pension benefit accruals 
to earnings below the social security taxable wage base (or some similar threshold) and higher benefit 
accumulations to earnings above this amount.  Terminal earnings plans tend to use the offset approach 
when they are integrated, while career earnings plans tend to use the excess method.  Integration is less 
common in plans using flat dollar amounts. 
Defined benefit pension plans have various other special benefit rules, many of which affect 
retirement benefits under certain conditions. Benefit “reduction factors” are important in determining the 
rate at which annual benefit payments are reduced for workers retiring early. These reduction factors may 
actually encourage rather than discourage early retirement, which occurs when early-leavers receive a 
larger total value of benefits (in present value terms) than those working to the normal retirement age.   
 Another feature of interest to pension experts is worker access to pension accruals for special 
reasons, including for early receipt of vested benefits and for disability.  When employees can cash out 
their vested accrued benefits, they may fail to save the accumulations for retirement  (Fernandez, 1992).  
Disability pensions are another way in which workers can receive benefits prior to becoming qualified for 
a regular pension, and hence these too play a role in workers’ economic security benefits.   
Defined Contribution Plans: The institutional structure of defined contribution plans is as varied as among 
their defined benefit counterparts, but along different dimensions.  Many different types of plans exist, 
categorized according to various classification schemes.  In the past, the BLS distinguished between 
plans it called “retirement” plans, versus those called “capital accumulation” plans; the former generally 
prohibited withdrawal of pension accruals prior to retirement, and the later afforded easier access to plan 
assets.  But over time, it has become clear – and the BLS has recognized – that “most defined 
contribution plans can be used to provide retirement income or to accumulate financial assets” (U.S.  
 
DOL, 1989, p.107).  In addition, many of these plans allow lump-sum cash-outs rather than a benefit 
annuity.   
Another change seen recently is the development of several new DC plan types. Experts often 
distinguish among defined contribution plans according to the source of their finances, or to the way in 
which their assets are held.  Examples include savings and thrift plans, profit-sharing programs, money 
purchase pension plans, employee stock ownership/stock bonus plans, and 401(k) plans.  Savings and 
thrift plans are those where workers contribute a percentage of their pay and employers generally offer 
some amount of matching contribution (perhaps up to a maximum).  The tax treatment of employee 
contributions depends on both individual plan structure and overall tax code limitations on the amount of 
compensation that can be tax deferred.  Savings and thrift plans often permit workers to borrow from or 
make taxable withdrawals from their plans in special circumstances (e.g., educational or medical 
expenses).  Profit sharing plans offering deferred income tend to link employer contribution levels to 
company profits, and then allocate the employer contribution levels to company profits, and then allocate 
to employer contribution based on workers’ pay or other formulas.  Early withdrawals or loans are rather 
less common here than in other plans.  In a money purchase plan, employer contributions are fixed, 
usually as a fraction of earnings, whereas in stock ownership and stock bonus plans the employer 
contributions are usually in the form of company stock.  And from the late 1980’s on, 401(k) pensions 
have grown quite rapidly.  
 
Changes in Pension Plans: 1980-1997 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics presents tabulations of Employee Benefits Survey (EBS) data on 
pensions in two separate segments, one focusing on DB plan features, and the other on DC plan aspects. 
We follow that format here, with reference to the relevant tables we have collected for our purposes that 
appear at the end of this report.  
There are some important caveats about the EBS data that must be noted before proceeding to 
the results. Over time, there have been some important changes in plan type, contribution and benefit 
features, and other aspects of the way retirement income is delivered by company pension plans. Some 
of these changes were driven by regulatory change, some by changing market conditions, and others by 
external developments – such as the massive increase in the U.S. stock market during the 1990s.  In 
response, the BLS has sought to adapt the EBS by adding to the original DB focus evidence on new plan 
types over time. For instance, since the mid 1980s the reporting tracked profit sharing and savings/thrift 
plans, and more recently it has added information on 401(k) plans as well. In addition some series are no 
longer reported in the late 1980’s, and new series were added for the first time during the early 1990’s. 
Our effort in this analysis was to provide as much data as could be gleaned from the tabulations, but the 
inevitable changes in pension plan design render some of the tabulations time-inconsistent over time. 
Special note is made if this is a particular issue in any table.  
 
Another caveat arises because the BLS has not used generated findings using identical table 
formats in all years. This makes some of the time series inconsistent and in a few cases, not available at 
all in some years.  As a result, missing information in some data series can render interpretations difficult 
in some cases. One tabulation effort phased out, despite its clear interest to DB plan analysts, is the 
series indicating how benefit amounts compare to pre-retirement pay. Also in the EBS reports, definitions 
are sometimes inconsistent over time in terms of plan type, contribution and benefit features. Finally, 
there are important cases where tabulations cannot be compared because they use a different base over 
which the prevalence of a certain feature is computed. For instance, it is not possible to derive a time 
series on the percent of workers with multiple plans of particular types, since the base over which these 
numbers were calculated changed in the early 1990s. Greater consistency in table design would be 
invaluable to future researchers seeking to draw more conclusions from these interesting data in the 
future. 
 
Defined Benefit Plans. Time series EBS data are available on three important characteristics of defined 
benefit pension plans: (1) participation, eligibility and vesting; (2) withdrawal and benefit formulas; and (3) 
special provisions. Trends in each are examined in turn. 
Participation, Eligibility and Vesting. Defined benefit pension plans typically specify criteria that covered 
employees must meet before becoming full-fledged pension participants. Such requirements are justified 
by the need to reduce administrative costs that would otherwise be incurred for young workers. The effect 
of these participation requirements is thought to be a reduction in turnover by offering workers an 
incentive to remain with the company (Gustman and Mitchell, 1992).  Under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, full-time employees age 25 or older must be granted participant 
status after completing 1 year of service. Participation rules were subsequently amended by the 1984 
Retirement Equity Act (REA), which for most plans lowered the participation requirement to age 21 as of 
mid-1986. 
The EBS information on plan participation requirements (Table 1) indicates that there was a 
steady increase in the percent of full-time employees covered by DB plans having a minimum age and/or 
service requirement, over the period 1981-1997.  Among DB plan participants in 1981, 59% had minimum 
age and/or service requirements; this fraction grew to 68% by 1997.  About half of the plans require only 
1 year service, with the other half covered by the “age 21/service 1” rule imposed by the REA. Virtually no 
plan has an “age only” criterion. The pattern is therefore consistent with the notion that the law change 
(REA) was successful in bringing about earlier participation for many workers, but the drop in the fraction 
of workers age 21-24 permitted to participate in their plans in their first year of service seems to have 
worked in the opposite direction.  
Also appearing in Table 1 is information on a practice permitted by ERISA until 1988, namely the 
imposition of participation limits if a worker joined a firm within 5 years of the pension plan’s normal 
retirement age.  During the 1980s, this practice permitted firms to hire older workers without incurring  
 
large pension obligations, and as of 1981-2, some 60% of covered workers were in plans of this type. But 
the 1986 Omnibus Reconciliation Act (OBRA) eliminated maximum age restrictions from 1988 onward, by 
which year the fraction dropped slightly, to 47%.  The BLS did not tabulate comparable data thereafter, 
but the pension change brought about by OBRA likely increased employment costs for firms hiring older 
workers near the plan’s retirement age.     
Once a worker becomes a DB plan participant, he must typically satisfy a plan service 
requirement before gaining a legal vested right to his accrued benefit.  Economists have argued that 
these vesting requirements serve to deter worker turnover, inasmuch as vesting guarantees and eventual 
retirement benefits would otherwise be lost if a worker changed employers (c.f., Gustman and Mitchell 
1992; Gustman et al. 1994 and 1995).  In 1974, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
specified a number of permissible vesting formulas including a “10-year cliff” rule requiring an employee 
to participate in the plan for a decade, before becoming 100% vested.  Subsequently, the 1986 Tax 
Reform Act (TRA) required single-employer plans to convert to a 5-year schedule if using cliff vesting (or 
7 years if graded vesting was in place); the 5-year approach was adopted by most plans by 1989.    
Table 2 shows that the fraction of DB plan participants with cliff vesting hovered around 89% 
during the 1980s and began to rise in the 1990s, ending at around 96%.  At the same time, the modal 
number of years until vesting fell between 1988 and 1989, consistent with the declining legal threshold.  
Graduated vesting schedules give an employee a right to a gradually increasing share of accrued 
benefits, eventually reaching 100% at a specified age and/or service point.  Such schedules covered 
about 11% of all DB participants in 1980, rose to 17% in the late 1980s, but then fell back down to 3% by 
1997.  Overall, vesting requirements in DB plans have definitely eased, as compared to the early 1980s.   
Contributions.  Turning to contributions, Table 3 shows that most private sector DB plan participants are 
rarely required to contribute to their pensions out of their own salary or earnings.  This question has only 
been tracked since 1993, but the evidence shows that only 3-5% of DB participants are required to make 
employee contributions.
6  
Withdrawal and Benefit Formulas. We focus next on conditions under which participants can access the 
funds in their pension accounts. DB plans generally specify minimum age and/or service criteria that a 
worker must satisfy in order to retire and receive “early” benefits.  The relevant trends are reported in 
Table 4, where we see that early retirement was and has remained the norm in the DB environment, with 
over 90% of covered employees having this since 1980.  But the fact that early retirement is generally 
available obscures changes in requirements for collecting early benefits.  For instance earlier retirement 
has grown more accessible over time: in 1982, 58% of all participants could leave at age 55 (in some 
cases, depending on service), and by 1993 this fraction stood at 66%.  But the trends are not uniform: in 
the late 1980s there was a peak in the fraction of workers permitted to leave at age 55 with 10 years of 
service, and then this practice appeared to fall during the 1990s.  Conversely, it became much easier to 
retire with only 5 years of service at age 55,with the fraction in this group rising from 3% to 20% between  
 
1980 and 1997.  It is interesting that relatively few participants are in plans where they must satisfy only 
an “age plus service” requirement (5% in 1980, 10% in 1985, and 8% in 1997). 
Turning to “normal” retirement requirements, most DB plans require retirees to meet certain age 
requirements, or alternatively age plus service requirements to receive full, unreduced, benefits (Table 5).  
Only 11% of DB plan participants in 1980 could obtain normal retirement by virtue of service alone, and 
30 years was the typical cutoff; by 1997, fewer than half this many (5%) of the participants could take 
normal benefits based on service alone.  Just under half of all participants were subject to normal 
retirement eligibility rules that only depended on age in 1980, with that fraction remaining fairly stable over 
the entire period.   Where age only serves as the criterion for normal retirement, age 65 has long been a 
common threshold.  Turning to requirements involving both age plus service, it appears there has been a 
growing propensity of participants to have normal retirement available at age 62 with some combination 
of years of service.  In 1981, 17% of the participants were able to retire at 62 with full benefits (4% at 62 
with no service plus 13% with some service); by 1997 this fraction had risen to 21% (3% and 18% 
respectively).  In other words there appears to be a continued trend toward permitting workers to retire 
before age 65 and receive full (unreduced) benefits.  These patterns are in line with findings from other 
studies indicating that some DB plans have sought to encourage earlier retirement over time (Luzadis and 
Mitchell, 1991; Mitchell and Luzadis, 1988).  Whether this pattern will persist into the tight labor markets 
projected for the next 20 years remains to be seen. 
Benefit formulas are described in Table 6, where we see that the fraction of DB plan participants 
with benefit credits based on a flat dollar amount per year of service fell from 30% to 23% between 1980 
and 1997. This decline may be due to the steady drop in the unionization rate of the U.S. workforce, since 
flat dollar benefits were traditionally associated with collective bargaining agreements.  Indeed, by the 
1990s most DB plans surveyed used workers’ earnings to determine benefit amounts. This fraction stood 
at around 2/3 of all participants in 1997, virtually the same as in 1980.  It is also interesting that terminal 
rather than career earnings have long been in the majority for DB benefit formulas using pay to base 
benefits on, since using the former pay definition is believed to protect benefits from inflation.  The 
fraction using terminal pay in benefit computations has moved little around the 55-58% level over the 
period, with 11%-15% of all DB participants having benefits computed using career earnings.  On the 
other hand, using terminal earnings does link retirement benefits to individual performance at the end of 
the worklife, as compared to career average plans.    
 Besides knowing that earnings are included in the benefit formula, it is also necessary to define 
what definition of pay is used.  Table 7 indicates that DB plans have increasingly tied benefits to straight-
time or base pay alone, rising from 44% to 62% in just the eight years between 1988 and 1995 (data for 
1997 are not tabulated). Similarly the DB plans have reduced their reliance on shift differentials, bonuses, 
and commissions in the formulas. These factors taken together signal a reduction in the incentive-based 
portion of pensions, as compared to earlier years.  Some might see this as a cut in benefit value for older  
 
workers, thought it also might make it easier for older workers to remain on the job without prejudicing 
their potential retirement DB benefit amounts, should they experience a productivity decline.  
Defined benefit plans generally allocate benefits according to some percentage per year of 
service or pay, and these fractional benefit rules are summarized in Tables 8 and 9. For career earnings 
plans, only about one-third of all participants in 1991 were covered by a plan with a flat percent per year 
of service, with the most common percentage being 1.25-1.75% of pay (the data were not tabulated for 
the more recent years; see Table 8).  By contrast, some 60% of participants were in plans paying benefits 
where the fraction of pay varied by years of service, with the modal pattern being a fraction varying by 
earnings.  For terminal earnings plans, Table 9 shows that most plans used five years’ pay, with five 
consecutive years being the most common approach.  Nevertheless, there was a small increase in the 
prevalence of plans using three instead of five years of pay, rising from 14% to 17% over the period 1983-
1997.  More confounding is the inverted U-shaped pattern in the fraction of pay used in benefit formulas: 
early in the 1980s, 47% of the participants had benefits that were a flat percentage per year of service 
(with the norm being in the range of 1.25-1.75%). Then the fraction of participants using a flat percentage 
per year of service in the benefit formula rose slightly, to 54% by the late 1980s, and subsequently it fell 
to 35% by the late 1990s.  By contrast, over time, plans were more likely to employ benefit percentages 
that depended on other factors, with the fraction depending on earnings rising and on service falling.  
Finally, Table 10 provides tabulations on the prevalence of dollar amount formulas over time.  Here it is 
clear that the plans using dollar amounts raised those dollar levels over time, with the modal factor now 
being over $30 per year of service (these increases might not have been sufficient to keep up with 
inflation, however).   
Benefits paid by DB plans depend not only on earnings or service-based formulas; in addition, 
retiree payments are frequently integrated with Social Security benefits. Table 11 shows that 45% of DB 
plan participants had their benefits integrated with Social Security in 1980, and though the integration 
fraction crept up to 63% by 1989, it fell back again by 1997 (to 49%).  What is interesting is that this 
overall pattern hides major changes in the way integration has been handled over time. Specifically, 
between 1980 and 1997, the fraction of workers with benefits offset by Social Security payments fell from 
30% to 13%; what grew instead was the prevalence of plans with excess formulas. In the latter case, a 
DB formula might provide 1% of pay up to the Social Security earnings threshold per year of service, for 
example, with some higher fraction (such as 1.5%) for pay above this level. So while there is no overall 
change in the degree of Social Security integration reported in the Employee Benefits Survey, the type of 
integration used has actually changed substantially.
7  It is of interest to recognize that these changes in 
pension integration practices coincide with large Social Security payroll tax increases; though a casual 
relationship cannot be proven in the data, the correlation is striking.   
 For those who retire early, DB payments are often reduced to recognize that early retirees will 
receive these payouts over a longer period of time. Table 12 summarizes time trends in DB plan early 
retirement reduction factors, and the evidence indicates that that early retirement subsidies have been the  
 
norm over the entire period. This may be concluded because in both 1982 and 1997, one-quarter of all 
DB participants were covered by early retirement reduction factors of 6% or smaller; a reduction of more 
than 6% is generally deemed as necessary to represent actuarial neutrality (McGill 1996).
8  Reduction 
factors also apply to vested workers who leave their employers, where it also appears that vested 
terminated workers face benefit reductions of 6% or less (but only three years of data are provided 
making it difficult to confirm the trend).  Among the 61% of employees whose early retirement reduction 
factors vary with either age or service, some subsidization of early retirement could be expected as well, 
but the BLS data do not permit the determination of the precise size of this group. The final panel of Table 
12 shows that at least 90% of plans permit vested terminated workers to take their benefits prior to 
normal retirement, but only about half face the same reduction as applied to early retirees. 
 Benefit formulas are often quite complex to interpret, and for many years, the BLS provided a 
useful set of tabulations that could be used to compare retirement benefits for different hypothetical 
workers in the set of DB pensions under study.  The technique adopted involved using plan information to 
compute “replacement rates”, defined here as the ratio of the DB retirement plan benefits to the worker’s 
final year of earnings.  These computations were published only for the period 1984-1993, calculated at 
the normal retirement age using six standardized pay levels and three seniority profiles (see Table 13).  
Unfortunately the agency ceased publishing these computations after 1993. 
In any event, DB plan replacement rates rise with service for a given pay level and generally rise 
for a given service/earnings combination; in EBS tabulations they follow this pattern both within a 
particular year and also over the time period 1984 –1991 (Table 13). This regularity is in sharp contrast to 
the marked fall in computed replacement rates reported in 1993. Unfortunately no comparable 
computations were published by the BLS thereafter; the continuation of this critical time series in future 
reports would be invaluable.  
Comparing replacement patterns within service categories, the evidence suggests that DB plan 
benefit formulas were fairly redistributive.  In particular, replacement rates were higher for the lower paid 
and fell as pay rose for a given level of service.  For instance, in 1993, the latest year reported, the 
replacement rate for a 30-year worker earning $15,000 was 27%, but 21% for a $65,000/year earner. We 
note that the “illustrative” pay levels reflected in the Table are not comparable in real terms, since a 
constant nominal earnings assumption implies a falling real pay level over time.  As a rough correction for 
inflation, one may compare replacement rates for a $25,000 worker in1984 with those of a $30,000 level 
in 1989, and these with that of a $35,000 worker in 1993.  This simple comparison approximately controls 
for inflation over the relevant period. The results imply that pension replacement rates were fairly constant 
over the time period given; that is, holding constant real pay levels, benefit replacement rates for 10, 20, 
and 30 years of service changed relatively little over the years until 1991. Again, the exception occurs in 
the final year of data tabulated (1993) and no follow-up is possible due to the lack of reporting.   
Special Provisions in DB Plans. In the private sector, few pensions are protected against inflation by 
formal indexation; as a rule, private pension benefits are usually delivered as fixed nominal annuities.   
 
This is not a major concern for many older workers and retirees during low-inflation periods, but even a 
modest 3% inflation rate can cut the real value of the benefit in half in only 24 years.  Despite this, Table 
14 reveals that DB pension benefits are only rarely tied to an explicit cost of living index (COLA). In 1995, 
for instance, only 7% of EBS participants had a COLA, and only 3% had an automatic escalator.  Quite 
frequently benefits are not increased at all post-retirement, as can be seen by the fact that only 4% of the 
participants had plans with discretionary benefit increases in 1995.  This is quite extraordinary given the 
generally strong equity market performance experienced by most of these plans during the 1980s and 
1990s; it might be attributed to the low inflation rates over the period.  
In addition to these other benefit provisions, private pensions frequently impose a ceiling on 
benefit amounts payable to retirees.  The prevalence of this phenomenon has been declining as is 
evident from Table 15.  In 1984, for instance, 42% of the participants faced a benefit maximum; by 1997, 
only 33% were capped.  In plans that did limit benefits, they tended to do so by capping the number of 
years of service that may be counted for benefit purposes. In 1997, for instance, 31% of the DB 
participants faced a maximum limit on service years.  The modal choice for a maximum has generally 
been between 30 and 39 years of service since 1984. 
 In addition to early and normal retirement, most of DB plan participants – three-quarters, in 1997 
– are also covered by plans that will pay disability benefits (Table 16).  The prevalence of disability 
pensions seems to have changed over time, however; in 1988 coverage stood at 92%, but it was only 
75% by 1997.  It is not entirely clear why this sudden drop occurred, though one explanation might be the 
rising expense of private disability insurance over the period. In addition many DB plans tightened 
employee access to disability benefits by requiring that employees wait a longer time to qualify for long-
term disability benefits: in 1997 only 46% of the workers were eligible for immediate disability benefits, 
down from a high of 70% in 1980. Other aspects of the disability insurance plans were also tightened up, 
with disabled employees becoming less likely to received credit service until the establishment’s 
retirement date, and less likely to receive unreduced normal benefits.    
 A final aspect of DB payout design is highlighted in Table 17, which describes the prevalence of 
employer willingness to permit retirees to take their benefits as a lump sum instead of a life annuity.  
Lump sums were unheard of in traditional DB plans; by 1991, only 14% of participants could take any 
lump sum while six years later, almost a quarter (23%) could do so. (Of those with access to a lump sum, 
the majority was generally permitted to take the entire amount in a lump sum.) This trend underscores 
other evidence indicating a decline in retirement income annuitization in the U.S. (Mitchell, Poterba, 
Warshawsky, Brown, 1999).  
  
Defined Contribution Plans.  In examining trends in DC pension plans, we draw on published BLS 
evidence on (1) coverage and vesting patterns, (2) contributions and withdrawals, and (3) special features 
of 401(k) plans.  It should be noted that defined contribution plans experienced a rapid growth in 
popularity over the last two decades, with numerous changes in plan type, plan design, and plan features.  
 
As a consequence, the BLS tabulations for DC plans also changed coverage and format over the years.  
In addition, the information on DC plans is generally of more recent vintage and less continuous over 
time, as compared to the more consistent information on DB plans.    
The BLS has traditionally focused on a set of DC plans defined as “retirement and capital 
accumulation” plans.  What is included in this set of plans has varied over time, depending on plan types 
identified in the process of data collection. Categories reported in the EBS tabulations include money 
purchase and profit sharing plans, saving and thrift plans, and cash and deferred salary reduction plans 
including 401(k)s.  Perhaps because plan types rise and fall in popularity, the DC time series are 
incomplete and report some features only to 1991. In other cases, the relatively recent development of 
401(k) plans means that tabulations on this particular plan type are less extensive than for some other 
plans.   
Plan Types, Coverage, and Vesting.  The BLS defines “retirement” plans as those where employer 
contributions are required to remain in the participant’s account until retirement, death, disability, 
termination, hardship, or attainment of age 59 ½; by contrast “capital accumulation” plans are those 
where a participant may withdraw the money under other circumstances.  Coverage is defined as being 
employed in an establishment offering a pension plan; some workers may not be actual participants if for 
instance they had not yet vested or had elected not to contribute to the plan and there was no minimum 
employer contribution. 
It is clear from Table 18 that there was a downward trend in retirement and capital accumulation 
plan coverage during the 1980s.  For the surveyed medium and large establishments, the percentage of 
full-time employees lacking pension coverage rose from 8% to 21% over the period from 1985 to 1991. It 
is also interesting that the percent coverage held relatively steady after that date, through to 1997.   
Establishing coverage trends for those workers with a plan is virtually impossible because the 
BLS changed the way it reported pension coverage data in 1993.  Table 19 collects available data on the 
fraction of pension-covered workers with a plan of a given type between 1985 and 1991; data beyond that 
point are not available in a compatible form.  This table confirms the substantial drop in the percentage of 
covered workers with a defined benefit or money purchase plan, falling from 89% in 1985, to 59% in 
1991. Table 20 shows a rapid growth of savings/thrift plans, where full-time worker coverage rates 
jumped from only 18% in 1985 to 37% in 1995.  
A slightly longer time series appears in Table 21, which shows that relatively few workers have 
profit-sharing plans; the fraction declined from a high of 22% in 1986 down to 13% in 1997.  Stock and 
stock bonus plans are also rare, and there has been no sustained growth in profit sharing plans.  Overall, 
the findings reinforce conclusions from other data sources indicating that the U.S. workforce has 
increased its participation in DC plans but reduced DB plan coverage over time (Piacentini and Cerino, 
199; Turner and Beller, 1989).   
 Requirements for participation and vesting in DC plans appear in Tables 22 and 23.
9  Comparing 
the three DC plan types for which data are available – savings/thrift plans, profit sharing, and 401(k) plans  
 
– it is clear that participation requirements differ substantially. In the first two cases, the plans generally 
require minimum age and/or service for participation, with fewer than 20% of the workers permitted 
immediate participation irrespective of age (the data from 1995 and 1997 are not exactly comparable 
since age conditions were not taken into account in the tabulations).  By contrast, some quarter of the 
401(k) plan participants were allowed immediate participation.  In all three instances, if a participation 
clause was in place, service of up to 1 year was the norm; relatively few plans also have an age 
requirement.   
Vesting rules for all three DC plans are reported in Table 23, and show first a loosening in vesting 
rules, followed by a tightening thereafter. An inverted U-shaped pattern is evident for savings/thrift and 
profit sharing plans, with the fraction allowing immediate full vesting rising from the 20-percentile range to 
the high 30s and even 40% by 1991, then falling back to the 20s by 1997. The time series is shorter for 
401(k) plans but indicates that more of the participants – 34% – could vest immediately on joining the 
plan.  This contrasts with data presented earlier on DB plans, where virtually no employees had full and 
immediate vesting. Among those unable to vest in their DC plans immediately, participants appeared to 
be evenly split between cliff and graduated vesting.  For instance in 401(k) plans, by the 1997 survey, cliff 
vesting (typically at 5 years) and graduated vesting (with two-thirds vesting at 5 years or later) were the 
norm for those without immediate full vesting. The trend to shorter cliff vesting is in part a result of the 
1986 Tax Reform Act requiring most plans using cliff vesting to convert to a 5-year schedule as of 1989.   
Contribution and Pre-retirement Access Patterns.  Published tabulations of EBS include data on 
employee and employer contributions, as well as conditions under which employees can access these 
contributions prior to retirement. 
 Rules for employee contributions in savings/thrift and 401(k) plans are summarized in Table 24, 
with the vast majority of participants having plans that base employee contributions on workers’ earnings 
– almost 90% in 1997 for both plan types.  Most employees are now allowed to deposit their funds into 
the savings/thrift plans pre-tax, a substantial increase from 1985 (similar data for 401(k) plans are not 
available).  Over the period, there was a gradual decline in the extent of earnings-based employee 
contributions, as much as a 10% fall in the former plan case.  The maximum fraction of earnings that can 
be contributed by employees has also been curtailed over time, with fewer workers being allowed to 
deposit more than 15% of their pay during the 1985-1997 timespan.  
 Evidence on employer matching contributions for DC plans appears in Table 25 for the period 
1985-1991; no more recent data have been supplied. Results show that almost virtually no covered 
employees had plans providing a specified dollar amount contribution (1% in 1991).  More commonly, 
employers match what workers contribute, with the modal match being 6% of pay; most plans (86% in 
1993) had contributions of 6% or less, and only a minority (15%) of covered employees had match rates 
of 7% or greater. In general, it appears that employer matching contributions averaged a much smaller 
fraction of earnings than did employee contributions, and the rate of employer match seems to be falling 
over time.  Employer contribution patterns for profit sharing plans appear in Table 26, indicating that  
 
around 60% of those with this plan type use fixed formulas – with most depending on profits, either as a 
fixed or variable fraction of profits.  The remaining 40% use no fixed formula in determining contributions.  
When it comes to allocation of profits, there has been a decline over time in the practice of allocating 
profits according to earnings, with “other” formulas – most notably “equally to all” –rising in importance.   
One area of interest has to do with trends in the ways that employees are allowed to access their 
accounts, either prior to or after leaving their jobs. The practice of allowing loans from employee accounts 
has varied tremendously in profit sharing plans (Table 26), with 25% of covered employees having this 
access in 1989, falling to 19% in 1989, and then rising to one-third who were permitted this access in 
1997.  A different pattern pertains to conditions under which employees are permitted to withdraw 
pension assets in the event of hardship or other circumstances in saving/thrift plans (e.g., at termination).  
Table 27 indicates a sharp cut in the fraction of people allowed to access funds in these plans: for 
instance throughout the 1980s, 70 to 80% of the participants could access employer contributions “early” 
(prior to retirement age), but by 1997 only 52% of the participants were able to do so.  Despite this 
apparent increase in access restrictiveness, there was almost a doubling in the fraction of workers 
allowed to take the funds in the event of “hardship”.
10   Access provisions for 401(k) plans are described 
in Table 28, where it appears that over half of all plan participants in 1997 could obtain funds from their 
plans via a loan, up from 43% in 1993.  Furthermore, the modal participant could obtain a loan for any 
reason, not just for hardship, and those permitted freer access from 39% to 45%. Therefore the pattern of 
employee access to DC accounts is a mixed one across plan types, with access becoming easier in 
401(k) plans, but more restrictive in other DC plans over time. 
Pension Payout Trends. Distribution of pension assets at retirement may take various forms. Table 29 
indicates that savings/thrift plans distribute their funds as cash in the vast majority of cases, and lump 
sum payouts are very prevalent – almost all participants have this access. Of more concern to those 
focused on the adequacy of retirement income is the fact that only about one-quarter of participants with 
these plans have access to an annuity, and this percentage has not grown steadily over time.  Installment 
plans may afford some retirement income security, but here too the practice seems to be declining: only 
41% in 1997 could take their funds in installments down from 59% in 1985. Unfortunately only a very 
short time series on payout options is available for 401(k) plans (Table 30), yet here a similar pattern 
prevailed.  In 1993, some 34% of the participants could take their funds as a life annuity, and by 1997 this 
option was available to only 27%.  Installment options were also falling in prevalence, from 49% to 41%. 
In general, then, workers retiring from a DC plan are less likely to have available to them the traditional 
annuity payout option that once was identified as a key element needed to protect retirees against 
longevity risk.
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Investment Choices.  One feature contributing to the widespread popularity of DC pension plans in the 
last 20 years is the fact that they typically offer employees some control over their pension investments.  
Table 31 illustrates trends in these choices and options for savings/thrift plans for the period 1989-1997, 
and Table 32 reports available information for 401(k) plans over the period 1993-1997.    
 
One factor worth noting is that different provisions typically apply to employee versus employer 
contributions.  For instance in 1997, rules governing the investment options for employee contributions 
were more flexible than for employer contributions.  That is, in 87% of the cases employees could select 
their savings/thrift investment options in 1997, but this applied to only 65% of employer contributions. 
Eight years previously, an even smaller fraction of the employer share, 53%, could be allocated by the 
participant. This compares to a virtually identical range of investment flexibility and investment choices for 
401(k) plans in 1997 (Table 31) in which 87% of the employees could elect among investment choices for 
their own contributions and 65% of employer contributions. It is also interesting that the modal number of 
investment choices available for both employee and employer contributions was 3 in 1989 for 
savings/thrift plans, and 4 in 1993 for 401(k) plans; by 1997 the modal number was at least 5 choices for 
both plan types.   
The evidence also indicates that the range of investment choices has changed over time, at least 
for savings/thrift plans (comparable data are unavailable for 401(k) plans).  For instance, Table 32 
indicates that the fraction of covered employees permitted to invest their own contributions in common 
stock fell from 83% in 1989 to 69% in 1997, but this decline was partly offset by an increase in employee 
access to diversified stock and bond funds (from 26% to 54%). In 1989, 60% of the savings/thrift plan 
participants were permitted to invest their own contributions in company stock; by 1997, the fraction 
permitted to invest in company stock had fallen to 42%.  The prevalence of workers allowed to deposit 
their own contributions in guaranteed insurance contracts fell from 64% to 20%, while those allowed to 
invest in bonds rose from 32% to 59% over the same period. Somewhat similar patterns appear to have 
applied to employer contributions in these plans, with employer stock and common stock funds declining 
in importance and diversified portfolios growing.  Thus, while employees were offered more investment 
options in 1997 than they were earlier, the types of investments they could elect in their savings/thrift 
plans tended toward diversified stock and bond portfolios rather than the less diversified options available 
during the 1980s.    
Finally there is modest evidence on the periodicity with which employees in savings/thrift plans 
are permitted to change their investment allocations in their DC plans. The available data collected in 
Table 31 cover only the time period from 1993 on, but they do suggest that employees are now more 
likely to be able to exert choice over their own contributions than previously.  That is, in 1993 only 29% of 
the covered employees could change their investment options anytime, and five years later the fraction 
rose to 47%.  (The fraction of workers allowed to alter the investments made with employer contributions 
is around one third.) Additionally, the number restricted to switching their own investment allocations four 
or fewer times per year fell from 56% to 24% in just five years’ time (and a similar pattern applies to 




 The EBS data tabulated here offers a uniquely valuable insight into changes in private sector 
pension plans over the last two decades.  One overwhelming impression is that of the tremendous 
amount of change experienced in virtually all plan features and design elements examined.  Not only 
have there been dramatic innovations in plan type, but there have also been important shifts in financing 
arrangements, benefit features, and the extent to which employees can flexibly allocate and access their 
retirement plan accounts. If these data series have a single clear message, it is that the U.S. pension plan 
environment has been a remarkably dynamic one in the last 20 years, with the only constant having been 
change. 
We emphasize that a reader must bear in mind some caveats when reviewing our findings. One 
is that the EBS tabulations reported here cover only pension plans offered by medium and large 
establishments: hence the results cannot be generalized to the entire U.S. pension environment.  A 
second is that the data have not been collected and presented in a constant set of formats and 
tabulations over time, so it is sometimes difficult to derive time series that are as useful as they might be. 
Nevertheless, we are confident that these trends in plan features are indicative of what has happened to 
pensions in medium and large establishments in the U.S., companies of the sort that traditionally were the 
most reliable providers of employer-sponsored retirement benefits in the country. 
 Some of the most striking changes we have identified occurred in the defined benefit pension 
environment.  These include changes in participation and vesting rules; increased access to early 
retirement; declines in normal retirement ages; and the movement of pension benefit formulas toward 
final rather than career earnings.  Benefit integration with social security also grew, but the type of 
integration changed substantially.  Pension replacement rates appear to have fallen over time, benefit 
ceilings remain in place, and disability benefit provisions have become more stringent.  Specific findings 
may be summarized as follows for the private DB plans in medium and large establishments:    
h Participation rules have become more stringent over time.   
h Vesting rules have eased over time.    
h Virtually no participants are required to contribute to their own pensions out of salary. 
h Normal retirement ages declined over time, with participants gaining access to unreduced benefits 
prior to age 65.  Early retirement has long been permitted, typically at actuarially subsidized rates.   
h DB benefit formulas have changed markedly over time. They are less likely to provide a flat-dollar 
amount per year of service, and they increasingly base benefits on pay. However straight-time earnings 
are more likely to be included (rather than incentive pay). Fewer workers have benefits offset by Social 
Security payments; more are covered by excess formulas that provide higher proportional benefits to 
those with higher earners.  Some plans cap benefit payouts by limiting the number of years of service 
counted in the formula.    
 
• DB formulas provide replacement rates that rise with years of service for a given pay level, but that fall 
at higher earnings level, given service.  Time trends in replacement rates are difficult to track since the 
EBS tabulations were discontinued after replacement rates fell markedly in 1993.  
hDB pension payments are generally not indexed to inflation.     
h It is increasingly feasible for retirees to take their pension benefits in a lump sum, suggesting reduced 
protection against outliving one’s assets.  
h Disability benefit provisions became more stringent over time with fewer plans offering disability 
benefits, and tighter access among those with the benefit.    
 Specific findings may also be summarized for the defined contribution plans in medium and 
large establishments:      
h Participation and vesting requirements differ across DC plan type, with lower participation 
requirements for 401(k) as compared to savings/thrift and profit shaving plans. Vesting rules are also less 
stringent for 401(k) plans than virtually any other plan type.   
h Employee contributions are the norm for DC plans, with most participants required to take employee 
contributions as a function of earnings.  Employers often match employee contributions with the modal 
match being 6% of pay, but the rate of employer match seems to be falling over time.   
h Employees are increasingly permitted to use loans to access their DC accounts prior to retirement, 
some of which is for hardship withdrawals; 401(k) plans have the most liberal access under a wide range 
of circumstances (not just for hardship).  
h At retirement, there has been a decline in the fraction of participants with access to a life annuity as a 
payout option, particularly from 401(k) pensions where only 27% have this option. 
h DC plan participants generally have choice over investing both their own and their employer’s 
contributions, with this access increasing over time. Participants have also gained access to diversified 
stock and bond funds, with fewer permitted to invest in own-employer stock, common stock funds and 
guaranteed insurance contracts. 
    
Discussion and Outlook 
The magnitudes of these changes in pensions over time should raise several questions about 
pension design and function in the United States. For some time now, it has been clear that small 
employers are quite likely to alter the scope and form of their pension offerings, having moved away from 
DB plans, toward DC plans, in the last several years. What is interesting in the present analysis is that 
this trend also applies to pensions offered by medium and large establishments, with pension plan 
design, features, and offerings changing rather remarkably over time. Evidently, company-sponsored 
pensions are clearly not static institutions fixed in stone, but instead respond frequently to their external 
environment, to internal corporate needs, and to labor market pressures. 
Changes in the pension environment over time are in part responses to changing workforce 
demography, new employer personnel needs, and probably most important, employee interest in  
 
investing in the U.S. stock market. But the pension environment also embodies some apparent 
contradictions, and these countervailing messages will no doubt require ongoing plan redesign efforts in 
the future. For example, many pension systems have low hurdles for employee vesting and participation, 
making it easier for mobile workers to gain benefit rights. On the other hand, giving young employees 
access to loans and lump sums can undercut the retirement saving objective critical to pensions. These 
practices may need revision in the near future.  
It must also be recognized that policymakers have often provided mixed signals to the pension 
system over the years, sometimes encouraging plan development, while at other times placing limits on 
plan saving. There is much to be learned from available evidence on how regulation has affected plan 
design over time.  This includes regulation of programs related to the pension system: for instance those 
charged with solving Social Security’s insolvency problems should explore how pension plans have been 
integrated with Social Security and how these patterns have changed over time. 
Going forward, it should be clear that collecting and reporting on the information contained in the 
Employee Benefit Survey is a substantial enterprise, and a uniquely valuable one. The EBS is the only 
employer-based national survey collecting and publishing provisions of company-provided benefits and 
pensions in particular.  There is simply no other data source in the U.S. that contains such a wealth of 
information needed for research and policy purposes.   
To build on these strengths, the BLS could do more to make the data maximally useful to 
researchers and policymakers.  First, a “core” set of tabulations should be carried out annually going 
forward, and replicated for each past year of the survey as well. Advice on which series to include in this 
core could come from policymakers, researchers, and practitioners accustomed to dealing with plan 
design and innovations in the plan arena.
12 Second, definitions should not be changed over time for key 
plan characteristics, unless series overlaps are provided.  Third, the BLS should be more consistent over 
time in its reporting of data, with regard to the groups over which percentage figures are calculated, to 
avoid misinterpretation of results.  Fourth, each table should include the same “base population” over 
time, so that the fractions of workers covered in one year can be properly compared with the same base 
in some other year. This was not always the case in tabulations undertaken to date. Finally, the BLS 
should make it possible for researchers to access the benefits data collected over time. This would permit 
a method of checking for changes, and would also permit researchers to devise additional tabulations and 
exploratory studies.
13   
Other improvements should also be implemented to make the EBS more useful. Future 
generations of the survey will of course need to adopt new questions and eliminate some old topics that 
are no longer relevant. But in the process of making these updates, it would be helpful to have outside 
research input into the survey format and tabular structure.  Tabulations could be designed with users in 
mind, so they can answer parallel questions across plan types. For instance, future reports could 
investigate the extent to which 401(k) participants can switch investment options, a tabulation currently 
provided only for savings/thrift plan participants. Another example, noted above, is that certain series  
 
were dropped despite the fact that they remained of substantial interest; the most notable is the 
replacement rate series for DB plans.  Without a coherent series, the data are of less use than they could 
be. 
Looking ahead, future Employee Benefits Surveys should be structured so that benefit plans 
could be linked within establishments. For instance, it would be useful to know more about the joint 
incidence and features of health, disability, and pension offerings within a particular workplace. This 
would permit analysis of potential substitution across benefit offerings, and interactions between the 
plans. In addition, it would be useful to link benefit offerings and plan design with information on benefit 
costs.
14  Finally, researchers and policymakers would be able to do much better work if the underlying 
micro-level data were made available for direct analysis, under restricted data access conditions. Pension 
research in the 21
st century would be immeasurably benefited by such improvements to an already-
valuable and rich set of information.    
 
Data Appendix: The Employee Benefits Survey 
 
 Those seeking a greater understanding of trends in pension formulas and provisions must 
understand how the BLS develops its Employee Benefits Survey data, tabulations of which we rely on for 
the present report.  
The Employee Benefits Survey (EBS) includes information on a wide range of employee benefits 
provided by U.S. employers, from health to insurance to pension plans. In the early days, these data were 
collected annually and only for medium and large establishments.  More recently, the BLS has used an 
alternating year format to track benefits in medium and large establishments (small establishments as 
well as public sector employers are surveyed in other years).  The BLS does not currently make available 
to researchers the underlying establishment-level reports, but instead publishes periodically a set of 
tabulations that is more or less consistent through time.
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In this paper therefore we collect and examine BLS tabulations on the pension plans offered by 
medium and large private employers, focusing on the incidence and characteristics of pension plans for 
full-time employees described in a series of publications appearing between 1980 and 1995.
16 In addition 
we were provided prepublication copies of the 1997 report by the BLS to round out the series.
17 
Readers should be aware of several caveats regarding the findings. First, the BLS focuses only 
on full-time employees.  Hence these findings do not apply to part-time or seasonal workers. Second, the 
definition of medium and large establishments changed in 1988. Until that year, the BLS used a sampling 
frame that included only establishments employing at least 50, 100, or 250 workers, depending on the 
industry in question.  Thus in the mining, construction, retail trade, and some manufacturing and 
transportation sectors, the survey approached establishments employing only 250 workers or more.  In 
accounting, auditing, and bookkeeping, the minimum establishment size was 50 employees.  But in 1988 
and thereafter, the BLS elected to focus on all establishments employing at least 100 workers.  As a 
result, by virtue of this change in scope, in 1988 the survey sample size increased from about 1,300 to 
about 2,100 reporting entities (U.S. DOL, 1989).  In addition, the BLS extended its industrial coverage in 
this year. Industries analyzed prior to the change included mining; construction; manufacturing; 
transportation; communications; electric, gas, and sanitary services; wholesale and retail trade; finance, 
insurance, and real estate; and selected services.  Beginning in 1988, coverage for the service sector 
became more extensive; in particular, health and educational services had previously been 
underrepresented and were thereafter included in the sample.   
 As a result of the sampling change in EBS scope and coverage, the pension data are not strictly 
comparable before and after that year.  Specifically in 1988 and thereafter, the BLS tabulations include 
more small establishments and offer slightly broader industrial coverage.  To explore series overlap, the 
BLS prepared some tabulations in 1988 both ways, showing how the design changes might have altered 
reported pension statistics.  The BLS did not, however, indicate whether differences in reported 
tabulations due to coverage format changes are statistically significant.  Where available, we provide both 
tabulations (for the “old” and the “new” scope) in the tables.  It appears that along many of the important 
pension dimensions of interest here, the “old” and “new” scopes appear similar.  Some differences do 
emerge: because the larger sample in 1988 and thereafter included smaller establishments, benefit 
coverage as well as benefit generosity was somewhat lower.  Hence with the new format, pension 
coverage in 1998 appeared to have fallen, requirements for normal retirement appeared to have suddenly 
become more stringent, and plans appeared to have dropped post-retirement benefit increases among 
defined benefit plan participants.  In the defined contribution area, more changes were evident because 
such plans were more prevalent among smaller firms.  For this reason, the reader should be alert to the 
fact some of the differences in levels observed between 1985 and 1998 are due to the change in the 
sampling frame.  
 
Table 1.                                 
Age and Length of Service Requirements for Pension Participation:  Defined Benefit Pension Plans, 1981-97             
                                
  Percenage of full-time participants       
Type of requirements  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1988†  1988  1989  1991  1993  1995  1997      
                                
No minimum age and/or service                            
   requirements  41  39  37  37  40  40  37  33  35  29  34  31  31      
                                
With minimum age and/or service                            
   requirements  59  61  63  63  59  59  63  66  66  71  66  69  68      
   Service only  20  23  20  22  23  21  27  28  26  26  26  27  28      
      <=1 year  NA  NA  18  20  21  17  23  24  22  26  26  25  27      
   Age only  4  4  3  3  3  3  3  3  4  4  4  3  1      
   Age and                                  
      service  35  34  39  39  32  35  33  34  34  39  37  36  36      
      Age 25 and 1                                
         year*  NA  NA  35  34  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA      
      Age 21 and 1                                
         year*  NA  NA  NA  NA  13  18  31  33  31  36  30  34  34      
                                
With maximum                                
   age limitation**  58  61  55  61  61  58  47  47  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA      
                                 
See Notes to Tables; also                              
   * The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 required that pension plans allow full-time employees age 25+ with at least 1 year of service to participate.  The Retirement   
Equity Act of 1984 required that nearly all plans allow participation to full-time employees age 21+ with at least 1 year of service by June 1986.  The 1986 data surveyed plans prior to the law   
change.                                
   ** ERISA permitted plans to impose a maximum age for participation within 5 years of the plan's normal retirement date.  The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986 eliminated such     
maximums for plan years beginning in January 1988, with slightly later dates for collectively bargained plans.              
 Data exclude supplemental pension plans.                           
 
Table 2                           
Vesting Schedules:  Defined Benefit Pension Plans, 1980-97                  
                           
  Percentage of full-time participants 
Vesting formula  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1988  1989  1991  1993  1995  1997 
                           
Cliff Vesting: *  89  91  90  89  89  88  89  82  89  92  96  96  96 
Full vesting after:                           
   10 years at any age  70  67  66  65  66  69  69  62  29  16  12  6  6 
   10 years after                           
      given age  19  21  22  22  19  17  18  15  9  ---  ---  NA  --- 
   5 years at any age  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  45  44  69  79  87  85 
                           
Graduated                           
   Vesting: **  11  13  12  13  14  13  13  17  11  8  4  3  3 
Full vesting after:                           
   <10 years of service  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  6  9  9  5  NA  NA  3 
   15 years of service  5  4  4  4  4  3  3  5  2  NA  NA  NA  --- 
                           
See Notes to Tables; also:                         
   *A cliff vesting schedule requires an employee to satisfy specific service conditions in order to become 100% vested.  ERISA defined 10 years as the maximum  
requirement for this form of vesting.  The Tax Reform Act of 1986 required single-employer plans to convert to a 5-year schedule if using cliff vesting.   
This provision was to be adopted by most plans during 1989, with slightly later dates for collectively bargained plans.         
** Graduated vesting schedules give an employee rights to a gradually increasing share of accrued pension benefits,        
eventually reaching 100% at specified age and/or service points.                 
 Data exclude supplemental pension plans.                         
 
Table 3           
           
Defined Benefit Plans:  Employee Contribution Requirements 1993-1997   
           
           
     Percentage of full-time participants        
  1993  1995  1997     
% with employee           
   contribution required  3  3  5     
% pre-tax contribution allowed  1  1  NA     
           
See Notes to Tables; also           
 Data exclude supplemental pension plans.          
            
 
Table 4                                
Minimum Age and Service Requirements for Early Retirement:  Defined Benefit Pension Plans, 1980-97              
                                
  Percentage of full-time participants       
Type of requirement  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1988  1989  1991  1993  1995  1997      
                                
Plans permitting early                                
   retirement *  98  98  97  97  97  97  98  98  97  98  95  96  95      
Service requirements alone  10  5  5  6  5  4  5  7  6  7  5  NA  8      
      30 years required  9  5  5  6  5  4  5  6  5  6  4  NA  8      
   Age requirements alone  9  10  9  10  10  9  10  10  6  6  2  NA  3      
      Age 55  8  9  9  10  9  9  10  10  6  5  2  NA  3      
   Age and service requirements:                              
      Age 55 and 5 years  3  4  4  3  4  3  3  4  9  17  20  NA  20      
      Age 55 and 10 years  NA  36  35  35  39  43  41  44  43  32  32  NA  30      
      Age 55 and 15 years  NA  11  10  9  7  8  7  10  8  10  12  NA  9      
      Age 60 and 10 years  NA  4  4  5  5  4  4  5  4  4  3  1  2      
      Age 62 and 10 years  NA  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  2  2  2  --  1      
   Age plus service sum  5  9  10  9  10  10  9  4  4  6  3  4  8      
      Sum equals 80 or less  NA  NA  NA  6  6  5  5  2  1  2  2  3  6      
      Sum equals 85 or more  3  6  5  5  5  4  4  1  ---  1  ---  ---  1      
                                
Plans not permitting early                                
   retirement  2  2  3  3  3  3  2  2  3  2  5  4  5      
                                
See Notes to Tables; also                                
   * Early retirement is defined as the point when a worker can retire and immediately receive accrued benefits based on service and earnings; benefits are reduced for years prior to the   
normal age.                                
  Data exclude supplemental pension plans.                             
                                  
 
Table 5                            
Minimum Age and Service Requirements for Normal Retirement:  Defined Benefit Pension Plans, 1980-97*      
                            
  Percentage of full-time participants 
Type of requirement  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1988†  1988  1989  1991  1993  1995  1997 
                             
Service requirements alone  11  14  13  17  17  14  13  9  7  8  8  5  6  5 
  30 years required  11  14  13  16  16  14  13  9  7  7  7  4  5  4 
Age requirements alone  45  46  43  38  40  37  40  35  42  43  39  33  48  41 
  Age 60  2  2  2  4  3  4  4  4  3  4  2  3  1  3 
  Age 62  4  4  4  2  4  4  4  4  6  6  6  3  3  3 
  Age 65  39  39  36  31  33  29  32  27  33  33  30  26  36  29 
Age & service reqs.  37  33  36  36  34  39  36  41  39  37  46  55  48  46 
  Age 55 and 20 years  NA  2  2  2  2  1  2  1  1  1  1  ---  ---  --- 
  Age 55 and 30 years  NA  2  2  2  2  2  1  1  1  1  1  3  3  --- 
  Age 60 and 1-5 years  NA  ---  ---  ---  2  ---  3  2  2  2  ---  3  1  1 
  Age 60 and 10 years  NA  2  2  2  2  4  3  3  2  2  2  1  3  2 
  Age 60 and 15-20 years  NA  **1  **2  **3  2  1  1  3  3  1  1  ---  ---  1 
  Age 60 and 30 years  NA  2  2  4  3  3  3  2  1  3  2  4  2  2 
  Age 62 and 1-5 years  NA  1  1  1  1  1  1  4  ---  2  2  5  4  3 
  Age 62 and 10 years  NA  8  9  6  7  11  7  13  11  10  7  7  9  11 
  Age 62 and 15-20 years  NA  **2  **2  **2  2  4  4  2  2  2  4  3  7  3 
  Age 62 and 30 years  NA  2  2  3  1  2  1  3  2  2  ---  1  2  1 
  Age 65 and 5 years  2  1  1  1  1  1  2  1  1  2  10  15  9  15 
  Age 65 and 10 years  NA  3  5  5  3  2  2  2  5  2  4  2  2  3 
Age plus service sum  6  7  8  9  9  10  11  15  12  12  6  8  9  8 
  Equals 80  1  ---  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
  Equals 85  3  3  3  4  4  4  5  6  5  6  3  NA  NA  NA 
  Equals 90 +  1  1  2  2  2  3  4  5  4  4  ---  2  1  --- 
                            
See Notes to Tables; also                            
     *At normal retirement a participant can retire and receive unreduced benefits immediately.              
     **Data available for 15 years' service only instead of 15-20.                    
  Data exclude supplemental pension plans.                          
                              
 
Table 6                             
Benefit Formulas in Defined Benefit Pension Plans, 1980-97                 
                             
  Percentage of full-time participants 
Formula based on  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1988†  1988  1989  1991  1993  1995  1997 
                             
Dollar amount*  30  32  30  28  28  29  26  27  26  22  23  22  23  23 
No alternative**  27  29  28  27  27  28  25  26  25  19  21  21  23  23 
                             
Earnings  68  66  67  70  68  70  72  71  72  75  70  72  69  67 
Terminal earnings  53  50  52  54  54  57  57  54  55  64  56  61  58  56 
   No alternative**  21  26  27  24  24  27  29  26  30  35  38  40  40  37 
Career earnings  15  16  15  16  14  13  15  17  17  11  14  11  11  11 
   No alternative**  8  10  9  10  8  7  8  10  11  6  10  8  6  8 
                             
Cash account or                             
   money purchase  ---  ---  ---  1  2  ---  ---  1  1  2  3  3  3  6 
                             
Percent of                             
   contributions  ---  2  2  1  2  1  ---  ---  1  1  4  2  2  3 
                             
See Notes to Tables; also                           
     *Dollar amount refers to a flat monthly amount per year of service.                 
     **Alternative formulas are generally designed to provide a minimum benefit for employees with short service or low earnings.     
 Data exclude supplemental pension plans.                          
 
Table 7             
Definition of Earnings Used in Earnings-Based Benefit Formulas:       
Defined Benefit Pension Plans, 1988-97           
             
  Percentage of full-time participants 
Type of formula  1988  1989  1991  1993  1995  1997 
             
Basic or straight-time earnings only  44  53  56  67  62  NA 
             
Plus overtime  43  37  35  32  32  NA 
   Shift differentials  35  30  19  23  24  NA 
   Bonuses  32  29  30  NA  NA  NA 
   Commissions  32  28  20  19  18  NA 
             
See Notes to Tables; also             
     Data exclude supplemental pension plans.               
              
 
Table 8                     
Career Earnings Benefit Formulas by Type:  Defined Benefit Pension Plans, 1983-91     
                     
  Percentage of full-time participants 
Type of formula  1983  1984  1985  1986  1988  1989  1991  1993  1995  1997 
                     
Flat percent per year of service  37  36  31  40  35  40  36  NA  NA  NA 
   Less than 1.25 percent  7  5  6  5  3  8  6  NA  NA  NA 
   1.25-1.74  26  27  18  29  24  23  21  NA  NA  NA 
   1.75-2.00  1  3  1  ---  2  2  1  NA  NA  NA 
   2.00 or more  2  1  6  4  5  8  7  NA  NA  NA 
                     
Percent per year of service  63  64  68  60  63  59  60  NA  NA  NA 
   By earnings  60  62  63  56  57  43  51  NA  NA  NA 
   By service  3  2  4  4  5  4  4  NA  NA  NA 
   Other  ---  ---  1  ---  1  12  9  NA  NA  NA 
                     
See Notes to Tables; also                     
 Data exclude supplemental pension plans.                      
                       
 
Table 9                     
Terminal Earnings Benefit Formulas by Type:  Defined Benefit Pension Plans, 1983-97         
                     
  Percentage of full-time participants 
Type of formula  1983  1984  1985  1986  1988  1989  1991  1993  1995  1997 
Definition of terminal earnings:                     
   Five years  83  86  84  84  82  81  82  83  78  78 
      Last 5  5  2  5  4  4  3  6  3  3  1 
      High 5  8  9  11  10  12  12  10  16  11  13 
      High consecutive 5  70  75  70  69  67  65  67  65  64  65 
   Three years  14  11  12  13  13  16  15  14  17  17 
      Last 3  ---  1  1  1  1  1  2  1  ---  1 
      High 3  2  1  3  1  1  3  1  3  5  5 
      High consecutive 3  12  9  7  11  11  12  11  9  12  12 
Other  3  3  4  3  5  3  3  2  3  3 
Fraction of pay used in benefit formulas:                     
   Flat percent per year of service  47  49  50  57  54  54  42  48  37  35 
      Less than 1.25 percent  8  5  6  7  6  12  9  9  12  11 
      1.25-1.74  23  26  29  32  34  25  24  30  18  14 
      1.75-2.00  4  5  5  5  4  5  3  4  3  9 
      2.00 or more  11  14  9  13  10  12  5  5  4  5 
Other percent per year of service  53  51  50  43  46  46  57  51  62  65 
      By earnings  23  24  25  20  23  24  36  36  41  39 
      By service  24  22  18  16  16  16  9  7  8  11 
      Other  6  5  7  7  7  6  13  8  13  16 
                     
See Notes to Tables; also                     
 Data exclude supplemental pension plans.                       
 
Table 10                     
Dollar Amount Benefit Formulas by Type:  Defined Benefit Pension Plans, 1983-97     
                     
  Percentage of full-time participants 
Amount per year of service  1983  1984  1985  1986  1988  1989  1991  1993  1995  1997 
Flat monthly amount  71  75  66  59  73  81  95  97  94  97 
   <$5.00  3  ---  3  4  ---  2  1  2  4  8 
   $5.00-9.99  16  19  10  10  8  7  5  6  2  4 
   $10.00-14.99  16  18  16  10  16  12  8  6  4  3 
   $15.00-19.99  27  30  28  21  20  18  26  12  9  10 
   $20.00-24.99  4  4  4  10  19  23  23  29  15  12 
   $25.00-29.99  1  2  2  3  5  16  17  18  9  11 
   $30.00 +  3  2  2  2  5  3  15  25  51  50 
Amount varies  29  25  34  40  27  19  5  3  6  3 
   With service  3  5  8  6  8  4  3  1  6  3 
   With earnings  28  20  26  34  19  15  2  2  ---  --- 
                     
See Notes to Tables; also                     
 Data exclude supplemental pension plans.                       
 
Table 11                           
Integration of Benefit Payments With Social Security:  Defined Benefit Pension Plans, 1980-97         
                           
  Percentage of full-time participants 
Type of formula  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1988  1989  1991  1993  1995  1997 
                           
Without integrated formula  55  57  55  45  44  39  38  38  37  46  52  49  51 
With integrated formula  45  43  45  55  56  61  62  62  63  54  48  51  49 
    Benefit offset by SS payment*  30  33  35  35  36  40  43  39  41  19  17  14  13 
    Excess formula**  16  10  10  20  20  27  24  26  24  36  31  37  36 
                           
See Notes to Tables; also                           
     *Pension benefit calculated is reduced by a portion of primary social security payment.                   
     **Pension formula applies lower benefit ratio to earnings subject to social security taxes below a specified dollar threshold.             
 Data exclude supplemental pension plans.                             
 
Table 12                           
Reduction Factors for Early Retirement and Early Receipt of Deferred Vested Benefits:  Defined Benefit Pension Plans, 1982-97       
                           
  Percentage of full-time participants     
Type of formula  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1988  1989  1991  1993  1995  1997     
(1) Early retirement reduction factor                           
        where applied:                           
     Uniform percentage* per year  46  45  41  49  46  50  49  47  36  40  43     
         Less than 3.0 percent  2  1  1  2  2  3  3  3  2  4  3     
         3.0  7  7  7  10  10  8  8  6  4  3  6     
         3.1 to 4.9  9  8  10  12  9  9  10  10  10  7  6     
         5.0 to 5.9  7  9  6  7  9  10  12  8  8  7  9     
         6.0  16  16  15  14  13  14  11  15  11  14  17     
         6.1 and over  5  3  2  3  3  6  4  4  2  5  4     
Percent varies with:                           
      Age  30  35  56  49  51  49  49  49  54  57  57     
      Service  3  3  3  2  2  2  1  3  10  3  4     
                           
(2) Deferred vested reduction factor where applied:                         
     Uniform percentage* per year  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  34  34  34  NA  NA  NA     
          Less than 3.0 percent  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  1  1  1  NA  NA  NA     
          3.0  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  4  5  5  NA  NA  NA     
          3.1 to 4.9  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  4  7  6  NA  NA  NA     
          5.0 to 5.9  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  6  9  4  NA  NA  NA     
          6.0  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  12  8  13  NA  NA  NA     
          6.1 and over  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  5  4  5  NA  NA  NA     
Percent varies with:                           
      Age  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  65  65  65  NA  NA  NA     
      Service  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  1  1  1  NA  NA  NA     
                           
(3) Def. vested available    prior to normal age              NA  98  93  90     
Reduction same  as early                       49  46  60  52     
                           
See Notes to Tables; also *Uniform percentage early retirement factors may approximate actuarial reductions.  Data exclude supplemental pension plans.             
 
Table 13                   
Average Pension Replacement Rates for Specified Illustrative Workers:  Defined Benefit Pension Plans, 1984-93     
                   
  Retirement annuity as percent of final earnings* 
Illustrative worker with  1984  1985  1986  1988  1989  1991  1993     
10 years of service and final annual earnings of:                   
   $15,000  11.0  10.9  11.1  11.9  12.1  14.2  8.1     
     20,000  9.9  9.8  10.0  10.5  10.9  NA  NA     
     25,000  9.7  9.5  9.7  10.0  10.4  12.0  6.9     
     30,000  9.7  9.5  9.7  9.8  9.9  NA  NA     
     35,000  9.7  9.6  9.7  9.8  9.8  11.2  6.6     
     45,000  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  10.8  6.4     
     55,000  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  10.8  6.3     
     65,000  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  10.8  6.3     
                   
20 years of service and final annual earnings of:                   
   $15,000  21.0  21.2  21.6  23.1  23.4  27.4  17.0     
     20,000  18.8  19.1  19.5  20.4  21.1  NA  NA     
     25,000  18.4  18.6  18.9  19.3  20.0  22.9  15.0     
     30,000  18.5  18.6  18.9  19.0  19.8  NA  NA     
     35,000  18.6  18.7  19.1  19.1  19.9  21.4  14.1     
     45,000  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  20.9  13.5     
     55,000  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  20.8  13.3     
     65,000  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  20.1  13.3     
                   
30 years of service and final annual earnings of:                   
   $15,000  30.8  31.4  31.5  33.5  34.6  39.3  27.0     
     20,000  27.4  28.3  28.5  29.6  31.3  NA  NA     
     25,000  26.6  27.6  27.6  28.0  29.7  32.5  23.6     
     30,000  26.5  27.3  27.4  27.3  29.4  NA  NA     
     35,000  26.5  27.3  27.4  27.3  29.5  30.8  22.2     
     45,000  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  30.2  21.5     
     55,000  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  29.0  21.0     
     65,000  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  29.1  21.0     
                   
See Notes to Tables; also *The maximum private pension was calculated using the earnings and service shown, not reduced for early retirement or  
joint-and-survivor annuities.  Replacement rates refer to the ratio of the retirement pension to the final year's earnings. Data exclude supplemental pension plans.  
 Later years information not published.                    
 
Table 14                     
Prevalence of Postretirement Benefit Increases:                   
Defined Benefit Pension Plans, 1983-97                     
                     
  Percentage of full-time participants 
  1983  1984  1985  1986 1988 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 
With postretirement increase available  51  47  41  35  27  24  NA  10  7  NA 
                     
Automatic COLA increase  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  4  3  NA 
                     
Discretionary increase granted, last 5 years  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  6  4  NA 
                     
See Notes to Tables; also                     
   Data exclude supplemental pension plans.                      
                     
                      
 
Table 15                   
Maximum Benefit Provisions:  Defined Benefit Pension Plans, 1984-97         
                   
  Percentage of full-time participants 
Type of formula  1984  1985  1986  1988  1989  1991  1993  1995  1997 
Not subject to maximum  58  60  59  60  59  61  63  65  67 
Subject to maximum*  42  40  41  40  41  39  37  35  33 
   Limit on service years  34  34  36  37  37  37  37  33  31 
       Less than 20  2  2  2  1  1  1  5**  5**  6** 
       20-29  5  3  6  6  5  5      6 
       30-39  32  24  22  23  24  25  25  29  19 
       40 or more  4  5  7  9  9  8  7  5  6 
   Other limit  11  8  7  6  6  4  1  1  2 
                   
See Notes to Tables; also                   
     *Sums of individual items do not equal totals because more than one maximum may apply.           
     **Sum of <20 and 20-29 years.                   
   Data exclude supplemental pension plans.                   
 
Table 16                           
Disability Retirement Provisions:  Defined Benefit Pension Plans, 1980-97                 
                           
  Percentage of full-time participants 
Plan characteristics  1980 1981 1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1988  1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 
Disability retirement available  87  88  89  91  90  85  89  92  81  79  69  73  75 
Minimum requirements for disability                           
     retirement where available:                           
   No age or service  16  15  16  14  17  16  13  13  12  20  11  11  NA 
   Service only  61  57  56  57  52  54  50  57  56  54  36  28  NA 
   Age only  1  1  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  1  ---  ---  1  ---  NA 
   Qualifies for LTD*  11  18  20  21  22  20  25  31  31  18  16  17  NA 
Benefit provisions for disability                           
      retirement where available:                           
    Immediate  70  67  66  66  62  60  55  52  57  63  41  45  46 
       Unreduced normal  55  51  51  50  48  47  41  39  42  46  32  29  30 
       Other  15  16  15  16  14  13  14  13  15  17  10  16  16 
Deferred  30  33  34  34  38  40  45  48  43  37  28  28  25 
          Service credit to retirement  24  27  30  29  31  32  37  39  37  28  24  24  21 
          Other  6  6  4  5  7  8  8  9  6  9  4  4  4 
                           
See Notes to Tables; also                           
     *Long term disability insurance.                           
   Data exclude supplemental pension plans.                             
 
Table 17             
Defined Benefit Plans:  Lump Sum Available at Retirement, 1991-97 
             
  Percentage of full time participants    
  1991  1993  1995  1997     
             
% with Lump Sum  14  10  15  23     
    Full Amount  9  9  15  22     
    Amount Limited  5  3  5  1     
             
See Notes to Tables; also             
   Data exclude supplemental pension plans.            
              
 
Table 18                   
Participation in Retirement and Capital Accumulation Plans, 1985-97       
                   
  Percentage of full-time employees 
Plan participation  1985  1986  1988†  1988  1989  1991  1993  1995  1997 
Covered by a plan  92  91  88  82  83  79  78  80  79 
    Retirement only*  71  67  69  68  69  69  NA  NA  NA 
    Capital accumulation only**  1  1  2  2  1  1  NA  NA  NA 
    Both  20  22  17  12  12  9  NA  NA  NA 
Not covered by a plan  8  9  12  18  17  21  22  20  21 
                   
See Notes to Tables; also                   
   Data exclude supplemental pension plans.                    
     *Includes defined benefit and defined contribution plans such as money purchase pensions, profit sharing, and savings and thrift plans     
 when employer contributions must remain in the participant's account until retirement, death, disability, separation from service, age 59 1/2, or   
hardship.                   
     **Includes plan in which employer contributions may be withdrawn from participant's account prior to retirement, death, disability,      
separation from service, age 59 1/2, or hardship.                  
 
Table 19. Combinations of Retirement and Capital Accumulation Plans, 1985-91           
                
       Percent of full-time participants 
Combinations covering participants  1985  1986  1988  1989  1991 
           
Defined benefit plan with:  89  85  76  76  59 
    No other plan  45  35  45  42  35 
    Profit sharing*  5  13  9  7  5 
    Savings/thrift  15  15  21  24  15 
    Stock plan  23  22  1  2  1 
    Money purchase  ---  ---  1  1  1 
           
Profit sharing plan with:  9  11  12  10  16 
    No other plan  7  8  10  8  8 
    Savings/thrift  1  1  1  1  5 
    Stock plan  1  1  1  1  --- 
           
Money purchase plan with:  ---  ---  5  5  7 
     No other plan  ---  ---  5  4  5 
     Savings/thrift  ---  ---  1  1  3 
           
Savings/thrift plan with:  1  3  5  8  29 
     No other plan  1  2  5  8  15 
           
Stock plan with:  ---  1  1  1  2 
     No other plan  ---  1  1  1  NA 
           
See Notes to Tables; also           
     *Includes profit sharing and saving/stock combination plans; excludes pure cash profit sharing plans.   
   Data exclude supplemental pension plans.  Later data not available.            
 
Table 20                   
Participation In Cash or Deferred Plans Including Salary Reduction Plans, 1985-95     
                   
                   Percentage of full-time employees 
Type of plan  1985  1986  1988†  1988  1989  1991  1993  1995   
                   
Cash or deferred plan*  26  33  42  36  41  44  36  45   
Salary reduction plan  26  31  40  34  38  40  35  44   
    Salary and thrift  18  21  27  22  28  28  29  37   
    Profit sharing  4  6  9  7  4  4  4  5   
    Money purchase  1  1  ---  ---  1  1  NA  NA   
    Other  3  3  5  6  5  4  3  2   
                   
See Notes to Tables; also                   
     *Cash or deferred plans are included only if they allow income to be deferred; data include employee contributions to various retirement plans but   
exclude cases where employee contributions may be required to a defined benefit pension plan.           
   Data exclude supplemental pension plans.                   
  Later data not available.                    
 
Table 21                   
Participation in Defined Contribution Plans, 1985-97         
                   
                    Percentage of full-time employees             
Type of plan  1985  1986 1988†  1988  1989  1991  1993  1995  1997 
                   
Savings and thrift  27  28  32  25  30  29  29  41  39 
Profit sharing  18  22  21  18  16  16  13  13  13 
Stock ownership  24  30  2  2  3  3  3  5  4 
Stock bonus  1  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  2  NA 
Money purchase  4  2  3  6  5  7  8  7  8 
                   
See Notes to Tables; also                   
   Data exclude supplemental pension plans.                   
 
Table 22                       
Age and Length of Service Requirements for Participation, Savings and Thrift, Deferred Profit Sharing Plans and 401(k) Plans, 1985-97     
                        
Type of requirement  Percentage of full-time participants       
Savings and Thrift Plans  1985  1986  1988  1989  1991  1993  1995**  1997**       
No minimum age & service  requirements  14  10  14  15  18  17  33  25       
With minimum age and/or                       
    service requirements*  86  90  86  85  82  81  67  75       
    Service only  70  73  64  62  57  55  NA  NA       
       < 1 year  16  15  11  12  13  14  11  22       
       1 year  48  50  43  45  39  38  55  52       
       2+ years  6  7  10  5  4  2  2  2       
    Age requirements                       
       Age 20 or less   4  6  6  5  4  8  NA  NA       
           and 1 year service  2  2  2  1  2  5  NA  NA       
       Age 21  11  10  16  19  21  18  NA  NA       
           and 1 year service  6  8  13  15  18  14  NA  NA       
                       
Deferred Profit Sharing Plans  1985  1986  1988  1989  1991  1993  1995  1997       
No minimum age & service  requirements  NA  14  9  6  5  16  24  31       
With minimum age and/or                       
    service requirements*  NA  86  91  94  95  82  76  69       
    Service only  NA  69  66  65  60  55  76  NA       
       < 1 year  NA  11  15  4  6  14  9  13       
       1 year  NA  49  44  54  52  37  59  54       
       2+ years  NA  9  6  6  2  3  8  1       
    Age requirements                       
       Age 20 or less   NA  3  4  4  6  11  NA  NA       
           and 1 year service  NA  2  1  1  5  6  NA  NA       
       Age 21  NA  12  21  25  29  16  NA  NA       
           and 1 year service  NA  7  19  23  ---  12  NA  NA       
                       
401(k) Plans                 1993  1995  1997       
No minimum age/service  requirements            17  27  27       
With minimum age/seniority            81  67  69       
Service only            53  NA  NA       
   < 1 year            14  11  13       
    1 year            35  52  54       
    2+ years                 3  4  1       
                       
See Notes to Tables; also                       
     *The Retirement Equity Act of 1984 required that nearly all plans allow participation to full-time empployees who have reached age 21 and have completed 1 year of service.  Plans may   
impose a service requirement of up to 3 years if vesting is then immediate on participation.  The compliance date for most plans was June 1986, but collectively bargained plus had slightly   
longer to comply.                       
     **Figures reported for service-only category in these years (age may also be required but separate tabulations NA) Data exclude supplemental pension plans.         
 
Table 23                 
Vesting Schedules:  Savings and Thrift, Deferred Profit Sharing, and 401(k) Plans, 1985-97   
                 
Type of plan  Percentage of full-time participants 
Savings and Thrift Plans  1985  1986  1988†  1989  1991  1993  1995  1997 
Immediate full vesting  25  26  27  30  31  34  33  29 
Cliff vesting* with full                 
      vesting after  12  20  20  24  31  29  25  30 
   1-2 years  3  5  3  2  2  2  1  3 
   3-4  2  7  7  11  9  9  5  6 
   5+  7  8  10  12  19  18  18  21 
Graduated vesting** with                 
       full vesting after  28  25  32  30  35  33  24  33 
    <4 years  4  2  4  4  3  5  3  10 
    5  16  15  21  19  21  18  12  15 
    6-9  4  4  3  5  10  10  8  9 
    10+  4  4  4  2  ---  ---  ---  --- 
Other  35  29  21  16  ---  ---  ---  --- 
                 
Deferred Profit Sharing Plan                 
Immediate full vesting  NA  29  22  37  40  18  37  29 
Cliff vesting* with full                 
      vesting after  NA  2  2  12  18  21  22  30 
   1-2 years  NA  2  ---  ---  ---  ---  2  3 
   3-4  NA  1  ---  4  1  6  2  6 
   5+  NA  1  2  8  16  15  17  21 
Graduated vesting** with                 
       full vesting after  NA  66  73  50  41  55  34  33 
    <4 years  NA  ---  1  2  2  2  1  10 
    5  NA  3  7  6  4  16  4  15 
    6-9  NA  14  29  28  37  37  28  9 
    10+  NA  49  35  15  ---  1  1  --- 
Other  NA  4  2  1  ---  ---  ---  --- 
                 
(continued)                  
 
Table 23 (continued)             
401(k) Plans  1993  1995  1997       
             
Immediate full vesting  34  39  34       
Cliff vesting* with full             
      vesting after  26  24  27       
   1-2 years  2  1  3       
   3-4  8  5  5       
   5+  16  18  19       
Graduated vesting** with             
       full vesting after  37  27  32       
    <4 years  4  3  11       
    5  18  13  13       
    6-9  14  10  9       
    10+  ---  ---  ---       
Other  ---  ---  ---       
             
See Notes to Tables; also             
     *A cliff vesting schedule requires an employee to satisfy specific service conditions in order to become 100% vested.  ERISA defined 10   
years as the maximum requirement for this form of vesting.  The Tax Reform Act of 1986 required single-employer plans to convert to a  
5-year schedule if using cliff vesting; this provision was to be adopted by most plans during 1989, with slightly later dates for collectively  
bargained plans.             
     **Graduated vesting schedules give an employee rights to a gradually increasing share of accrued pension benefits, eventually reaching  
100% at specified age and/or service points.             
   Data exclude supplemental pension plans.               
 
Table 24                 
Employee Contributions in Savings and Thrift and 401(k) Plans, 1985-97           
                 
Type of plan  Percentage of participants 
Savings and Thrift Plans  1985  1986  1988  1989  1991  1993  1995  1997 
Basis of maximum contribution, if allowed/required:                 
    Specified dollar amount  2  2  2  1  1  2  1  1 
    Fraction of earnings  97  98  95  97  93  91  83  89 
        <=5%  ---  1  1  2  5  5  2  2 
        6-9  5  10  8  9  7  10  5  4 
        10  17  13  13  12  12  19  10  7 
        11-14  21  20  19  20  11  15  13  15 
        15  8  9  14  17  20  19  21  33 
        16  32  29  24  21  22  16  18  17 
        17-19  8  8  9  9  10  4  7  8 
        20+  6  7  6  7  5  2  6  3 
     Other  1  ---  3  2  5  7  16  10 
Tax status of contribution, if allowed/required:                 
     Pretax contribution allowed  65  75  85  92  98  NA  NA  NA 
                 
401(k) Plans                 
Basis of maximum contribution, if allowed/required:                 
    Specified dollar amount  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  2  1  1 
    Fraction of earnings  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  91  83  87 
        <=5%  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  5  4  4 
        6-9  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  8  10  5 
        10  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  19  12  11 
        11-14  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  15  13  11 
        15  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  19  20  31 
        16  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  16  12  11 
        17-19  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  4  7  7 
        20+  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  2  5  3 
     Other  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  7  16  12 
Tax status of contribution, if allowed/required:                 
     Pretax contribution allowed  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
                 
See Notes to Tables; also                 
   Data exclude supplemental pension plans.                   
 
Table 25                 
Employer Contributions in Savings and Thrift Plans, 1985-97           
                 
                 Percentage of full-time participants       
Employer matching* contributions  1985  1986  1988  1989  1991  1993  1995  1997 
                 
Specified dollar amount:  9  7  5  4  1  NA  NA  NA 
Fraction of salary up to:                 
    <=5%  12  28  35  36  39  40  NA  NA 
     6%  52  54  47  47  43  46  NA  NA 
     >=7%  14  11  11  12  14  15  NA  NA 
                 
See Notes to Tables; also                 
     *Employees may contribute a percentage of salary up to a maximum; ceilings on employer     
matching contributions are generally lower.               
   Data exclude supplemental pension plans.                 
 
Table 26               
Provisions of Deferred Profit Sharing Plans, 1986-97           
               
  Percentage of full-time participants 
Type of formula  1986  1988  1989  1991  1993  1995  1997 
Employer contributions:               
 Based on specified formula  59  55  60  52  40  62  62 
     Fixed % of profits  NA  16  10  10  9  24  17 
     Other formulas  NA  39  50  42  31  38  45 
No formula  41  45  40  48  60  38  38 
               
Allocation of profits to employees:               
     Equally to all  1  1  1  2  7  6  18 
     Based on earnings alone  61  74  64  52  52  56  49 
     Based on earnings and service  10  12  9  13  11  7  8 
     Other  8  13  26  33  30  31  24 
               
Loans from employee's accounts:               
     Permitted  25  32  19  27  23  33  32 
               
See Notes to Tables; also               
   Data exclude supplemental pension plans.                 
 
Table 27                   
Provisions for Withdrawal of Employer Contributions Prior to Retirement,       
Disability or Termination of Employment:  Savings and Thrift Plans, 1985-97       
                   
  Percentage of full-time participants 
Type of formula  1985  1986  1988†  1988  1989  1991  1993  1995  1997 
No withdrawals permitted  20  18  29  28  29  50  51  43  48 
                   
Withdrawals permitted  80  82  71  72  71  50  47  43  52 
    For any reason  61  56  42  41  37  24  29  16  18 
        No penalty  30  19  15  14  17  16  NA  NA  NA 
        Some penalty  30  37  26  25  18  8  NA  NA  NA 
                   
    For hardship reason*  19  26  29  30  34  26  18  28  35 
         No penalty  14  21  21  22  27  17  NA  NA  NA 
         Some penalty  3  5  6  7  7  9  NA  NA  NA 
                   
See Notes to Tables; also                   
     *Commonly expressed hardship reasons include purchase or repair of primary residence, death or illness          
in the family, education of an immediate family member, or sudent uninsured loss.             
   Data exclude supplemental pension plans.                   
 
Table 28       
Loan Provisions of 401(k) Plans:  1993-97   
       
  Percentage of full-time participants 
  1993  1995  1997 
Loans Permitted  43  49  51 
     Hardship only  3  4  6 
     Any reason  39  44  45 
        
Not permitted  56  46  40 
Not determinable  1  15  9 
       
See Notes to Tables; also       
     *Many plants offer more than one form of cash distribution so sums of    
individual items exceed total.       
   Data exclude supplemental pension plans.       
 
Table 29                 
Method of Distribution of Account at Retirement: Savings and Thrift Plans, 1985-97   
                 
  Percent of full-time participants 
Type of distribution  1985  1986  1988  1989 1991  1993  1995  1997 
                 
Cash distribution*  99  99  97  97  99  NA  NA  NA 
    Lifetime annuity  29  25  25  28  30  30  17  25 
    Installments  59  52  49  52  52  48  30  41 
    Lump sum  99  98  95  96  99  98  85  91 
                 
See Notes to Tables; also                 
     *Many plans offer more than one form of cash distribution so sums of individual items may exceed total.     
   Data exclude supplemental pension plans.                 
 
Table 30         
Method of Distribution of Account at Retirement:  401(k) Plans:  1993-97 
         
  Percentage of full-time participants   
Type of distribution  1993  1995  1997   
         
Cash distribution         
     Lifetime Annuity  34  21  27   
     Installments  49  34  41   
     Lump Sum  98  92  91   
         
See Notes to Tables; also         
   Data exclude supplemental pension plans.          
     *Many plans offer more than one form of cash distribution so sums of individual items exceed total.    
 
Table 31             
401(k) Plans:  Investment Choices:  1993-97         
             
  Percentage of full-time participants 
  1993  1995  1997 
Investment Choices  Ee  Er     Ee  Er  Ee  Er 
Employee permitted to             
    choose 401 (k) investments:  86  58  83  64  86  65 
       1-2 choices  11  8  4  3  3  2 
       3 choices  23  13  15  11  11  8 
       4 choices  28  16  26  16  21  14 
       > 5 choices  25  22  37  35  31  24 
             
See Notes to Tables; also             
  Er: Employer,   Ee: Employee             
   Data exclude supplemental pension plans.               
 
 
Table 32                     
Saving and Thrift Plans:  Investment Choices, Investment Types, and Frequency of Investment Changes: 1989-97   
                     
           Percentage of full-time participants             
  1989  1991  1993  1995  1997 
Investment Choices  Ee  Er  Ee  Er  Ee  Er  Ee  Er  Ee  Er 
Employee permitted to choose                     
  saving & thrift plan investments:  90  53  91  62  86  58  74  58  87  65 
    1-2 choices  25  22  15  16  12  7  3  3  2  2 
    3 choices  36  40  32  33  21  13  13  10  11  3 
    4 choices  23  20  29  25  30  17  21  13  21  14 
    >5 choices  15  16  20  22  24  21  28  26  47  34 
                     
Types of investment choices:                     
    Company stock  60  50  50  36  43  49  40  27  42  25 
    Common stock  79  83  87  90  68  49  59  48  69  50 
    LT interest-bearing sec.  32  37  44  46  42  28  48  36  59  43 
    Diversified stock/bond  26  31  26  27  42  33  41  31  54  40 
    Guaranteed Investment  64  59  71  70  43  30  25  20  20  15 
    Money market  35  41  38  43  26  20  30  25  35  28 
    CD  3  4  2  2  1  1  4  2  3  2 
                     
Frequency of investment changes:                     
    Total with choice allowed  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  74  58  87  65 
        -  Anytime  NA  NA  NA  NA  29  32  38  32  47  36 
        -  Specified No.  NA  NA  NA  NA  65  63  31  21  32  22 
                1/yr  NA  NA  NA  NA  5  4  3  2  2  1 
                2-4/yr  NA  NA  NA  NA  51  49  20  15  22  17 
                >5/yr  NA  NA  NA  NA  9  10  8  4  8  4 
                           
See Notes to Tables; also                     
   Data exclude supplemental pension plans.                    
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1 For a discussion of the role of pensions in women’s retirement income see Levine, Mitchell and 
Phillips (2000). 
2 For a discussion of these and other effects see the studies reviewed in Gustman et al (1994, 1995), 
Ippolito (1986), and Mitchell (forthcoming). 
3 This discussion builds on Mitchell (1992). 
4 Cash balance plans are sometimes seen as a third type of plan, in that they seem to combine 
elements of both DB and DC pensions. However they are, strictly speaking, defined benefit plans 
because the plan sponsor guarantees the promised rate of return on participant assets (Rappaport et 
al., 1998).  In any event, thus far the BLS has not generated special tabulations for cash balance or 
hybrid plans. 
5 For a more complete discussion of integration with Social Security see McGill et al (1996). 
6 This pattern is markedly different from the public sector environment where most employees 
contribute from their own pay; see Mitchell, McCarthy, Wisniewski, and Zorn (forthcoming). 
7 Changes in pension integration practices over this period are probably also due to the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 that limited the permissible difference between contributions paid and benefits received 
by low-paid versus highly-paid employees (see McGill et al., 1996). 
8 Early retirement may also be subsidized in other plans using factors that vary with age and 
service, but this cannot be determined from available tabulations. 
9 Age requirements for vesting in pension plans ceased being reported after 1995 due to law changes 
prohibiting firms from using age as a vesting criterion. 
10 Exactly what constitutes a hardship according to plan sponsors is somewhat imprecise; the BLS 
indicates that possible reasons include purchase or repair of primary residence, illness or death in 
the family, education of an immediate family member, or sudden uninsured loss.  More precision 
about the definition of hardship would be useful in future surveys, particularly since it appears that 
the ability to withdraw such funds without penalty is increasing. 
11 In most cases, the retiree could likely roll a DC lump sum into an Individual Retirement Account 
and then purchase an individual life annuity.  In so doing, however, the retiree would lose access to 
the group risk pool and would be forced to pay for adverse selection costs as well as possibly higher 
loadings in the individual retail market (Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown, 1999). 
12 For example the 1997 data have nothing on cash-balance or hybrid plans, despite their evident 
interest in public debate over the last few years. 
13 This could probably be accomplished under restricted conditions such as those developed for 
restricted data users of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS); for details see 
http://www.umich.edu/~hrswww. 
14 A more complete discussion of this approach is provided in Gustman and Mitchell (1991). 
15 In the past the underlying microdata were available for researcher use but the raw data have not 
been released to researchers for the past several years because the agency has confidentiality 
concerns. 
16 See BLS (various years).   
17 The BLS also collects data on only three major occupation groups: professional and administrative, 
technical and clerical, and production and service.  Not included in any surveys are data for 
executive management workers and part-time, seasonal, temporary, and traveling employees. Hence 
the figures reported below cover only these key occupational categories. 